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I. INTRODUCTION
In many ways, estate planning has “grown up” quite a lot over the
past generation or two. It has established a variety of new tax-efficient
transfer techniques, emphasizing income tax savings and not just estate
tax minimization.1 It has attempted to adjust to changes in family structure2 and changes in reproductive technology.3 It has embraced plan* Alyssa A. DiRusso is the Whelan W. and Rosalie T. Palmer Professor of Law at
Samford University’s Cumberland School of Law and an Academic Fellow of ACTEC.
She holds her J.D. from the University of Texas School of Law and her B.S. in Psychology from Carnegie Mellon University. She wishes to thank her research assistants, Faye
Doss and Bradley Foster, for their excellent legal research and writing assistance.
1 For an example of an income-tax-based planning technique, see generally Jeffrey
Schoenblum, Strange Bedfellows: The Federal Constitution, Out-of-State Nongrantor Accumulation Trusts, and the Complete Avoidance of State Income Taxation, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 1945 (2014) (ACTEC Symposium Issue).
2 See Hadar Aviram & Gwendolyn M. Leachman, The Future of Polyamorous Marriage: Lessons from the Marriage Equality Struggle, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 269 (2015).
3 See, e.g., Erin J. Hoyle, Including the Frozen Heir: Expanding the Florida Probate
Code to Include Posthumously Conceived Children’s Inheritance Rights, 43 STETSON L.
REV. 325 (2014); Catherine Kim, Posthumously Conceived Children and their Social Security Benefits Based on State Intestacy Law: How Astrue v. Capato Changes Future Social Security Benefits as Technology Advances, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1141 (2013).
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ning for a variety of more exotic assets, from pets4 to digital
information.5
In other ways, estate planning has failed to mature properly and is
out of step with modern reality. One such failure – the focus of this
article – is its ignorance of changes in demographic patterns of
childbearing and life expectancy and the bearing this should have on the
Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax. Simply put, a generation is not what
it was a century ago.
Estate and Gift Tax has been at the center of my work life for well
over a decade, but it wasn’t until the birth of my third child that I gave
much thought to the tax definition of what constitutes a generation for
Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax purposes. The Generation-Skipping
Transfer Tax (GST Tax) applies to certain gratuitous transfers from a
donor to an individual who is two or more generations younger than the
donor.6 The stakes are high, with tax rates based upon the highest estate tax rate in effect at the time of the transfer,7 and the tax being an
additional tax layered upon a gift or estate tax.8 According to the Internal Revenue Code, a person is two generations younger than the donor
if certain familial relationships exist or the age difference between the
two is at least 37.5 years.9
I had my third child two weeks after my 37th birthday, and 20 days
after my husband turned 37.5 years old. If the familial rules did not
govern my husband’s generation – if, for example, he was my boyfriend
and not the biological father of the child10 – he would be considered to
be two generations older than our newborn.11 This is patently ridiculous
and out of touch with modern trends in childbearing age and actual
generational length.
A primary purpose of the 37.5-year rule is to simulate for non-related parties what truly constitutes a transfer that skips over a generation. At that goal, it fails. As parents of both sexes wait until later in
life to bear or adopt children, and as life expectancy increases, what
constitutes a “generation” changes over time.12 It is not static, and it is
4 See, e.g., Veronica Cerruti, Unleash Creative Planning Ideas for Clients with Pets,
42 EST. PLAN. 10 (2015).
5 See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, 90 N. C. L. REV. 1643 (2012);
Naomi Cahn, Postmortem Life On-Line, 25 PROB. & PROP. 36 (2011).
6 See I.R.C. §§ 2611-13.
7 See id. § 2602.
8 See id. §§ 2601, 2611.
9 See id. § 2651(d)(2).
10 A father is automatically assigned to the generation immediately older than the
son or daughter. See id. § 2651(b).
11 See id. § 2651(d)(2).
12 See infra Part III.

F15/W16]

THE GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX

309

not the same as it was in 1976 when the Generation-Skipping Transfer
Tax was established. The purpose of this article is to propose a solution
to the disconnection between the 37.5-year-rule and actual generational
length. As will be discussed in more detail, the proposal revolves
around using demographic data to measure generational length and periodically updating the definition based upon that data – in effect, indexing the length of a generation for “inflation.”
Having begun with an introduction, Part II of the article gives an
overview of the GST tax and its history. Part III notes sociological
changes relevant to generational length such as childbearing age and life
expectancy. Part IV notes the effective use of inflation indices throughout the Code to use as a model for generation inflation. Part V formally
proposes an inflation index for generational length for GST tax purposes. Part VI concludes the article.
II. THE GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX
While taxes on transfers of property at death have their roots in
antiquity, Congress added the modern Generation-Skipping Transfer
Tax in 1976 to supplement federal estate and gift transfer taxes.13 The
need for a supplemental transfer tax arose as the tax landscape was reshaped by the events of the twentieth century.
The Revenue Act of 1916, enacted by Congress amid World War I
in response to reduced trade tariff receipts, is the “direct ancestor” of
the modern federal estate and gift taxes.14 Allowing a $50,000 exemption (plus expenses) and graduated rates from 1% on net estates of up
to $50,000 to 10% on net estates over $5,000,000,15 the structure of the
1916 Act’s estate tax would, but for the numbers, look familiar to a practitioner in 2016. In New York Trust Co. v. Eisner,16 the Supreme Court
upheld the 1916 estate tax, which had been challenged as “an unconstitutional interference with the rights of the States to regulate descent and
distribution, as unequal and as a direct tax not apportioned as the Constitution requires.”17 In an earlier case, Knowlton v. Moore, the Court
addressed a similar challenge to the constitutionality of a “legacy tax”
enacted to raise revenues amid the Spanish-American War, and upheld
the legitimacy of such a tax as indirect.18
13 John R. Luckey, A History of Federal Estate, Gift, and Generation-Skipping
Taxes, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS Rep. No. 95-444 A, at 1 (Aug. 9, 2001), http://
research.policyarchive.org/270.pdf.
14 Id. at 6.
15 Id. at 7.
16 N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
17 Id. at 348.
18 178 U.S. 41, 110 (1900).
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As U.S. involvement in World War I deepened, the estate tax rates
were increased to 2% on net estates below $50,000 on the low end to
25% on net estates above $10,000,000 on the high end.19 Rates continued to climb to 40% on estates over $10,000,000 in 1924, and a gift tax
that followed the rate schedule of the estate tax and also featured a
$50,000 lifetime exclusion (along with an annual exclusion of $500 per
donee).20 Although repealed by the Revenue Act of 1926, the 1924 gift
tax was also upheld as a constitutional indirect tax by the Supreme
Court in Bromley v. McCaughn.21 Following the 1929 collapse of the
stock market and the onset of the Great Depression, Congress reintroduced the gift tax and increased the estate tax rates in the Revenue Act
of 1932 to raise revenues and finance the New Deal.22 World War II
further increased the demand for tax revenues, and estate tax rates
climbed to over 70% on estates over $50,000,000 (with gift tax rates set
at three-quarters of the estate tax rates).23 After the Second World
War, the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and other
conflicts continued to drive government spending; high estate and gift
tax rates persisted, and estate planners looked to alternative means to
transfer wealth between generations.
Prior to the introduction of the GST in 1976, the federal estate tax
captured transfers of property from decedents to others—but not transfers of property interests from someone other than the decedent to another, even though the decedent benefitted from the use and enjoyment
of that property interest during her lifetime.24 Meanwhile, the federal
gift tax captured inter vivos transfers. The prototypical device developed by estate planners in response to these tax considerations was a
trust for the benefit of the grantor’s child for life with the remainder
passing to the grantor’s grandchildren upon the death of the child.25 By
the late 1960s, the Treasury Department and Congress had begun to seriously examine the use of these trusts and their effect on the tax base
and equity of opportunity in wealth disposition across different income
levels.26 In 1976, the House Ways and Means Committee began considering an Estate and Gift Tax Reform Bill, and its GST provisions would
19

Luckey, supra note 13, at 7-8.
Id. at 8.
21 280 U.S. 124, 138 (1929).
22 See Luckey, supra note 13, at 9.
23 Id. at 10.
24 See Joseph M. Dodge, Generation-Skipping Transfers After the Tax Reform Act of
1976, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1265, 1265 (1977).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1267-68 nn.15-20 and accompanying text.
20
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subsequently be incorporated, with modifications, into the Tax Reform
Act of 1976.27
The 1976 Act dramatically restructured the federal estate and gift
tax landscape, unifying the estate and gift tax credits and replacing the
date-of-death basis rule with a carryover basis rule.28 Identifying the
termination of the life interest of intervening beneficiaries as a taxable
event (the death of the grantor’s child in the prototypical generationskipping trust example), the 1976 Act imposed the equivalent estate and
gift tax rates “which would have been applicable had the property had
been transferred outright by the donor and then by the first beneficiary”29 to the second level of beneficiaries (i.e., the grantor’s grandchildren—putting them on equal footing with their generational cohorts
whose parents and grandparents both did pay the estate tax).30 The
sweeping changes introduced by the 1976 Act prompted significant
pushback. Congress was forced to pass another Revenue Act in 1978 to
make technical and substantive changes to the 1976 Act’s estate and gift
tax provisions, and even to include changes to the estate and gift taxes in
unrelated bills like the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1980.31
The Trust and Estates Section of the American Bar Association submitted over two dozen proposals for legislative changes specifically related
to the GST.32 Many of these proposals sought to better define the terms
used in the statute and to clarify the application of the law, such as how
the law would operate in the context of blended families or in concert
with the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act.33 Despite changes in 1981 to
simplify estate and gift tax rules and dramatically reduce the top estate,
gift, and GST rates (from 70% to 50% on transfers over $2,500,000),34
by 1982 members of the American Bar Association and the U.S. Senate

27 Id. at 1268-69 n.21. The Reform Bill, H.R. 14844, proposed GST provisions
which very loosely resembled the American Banking Association’s proposal to the Ways
and Means Committee regarding such a transfer tax. Id.
28 Luckey, supra note 13, at 12. The imposition of the carryover basis rule would
subsequently be suspended until 1980 and, in 1980, repealed retroactively to the effective
date of the 1976 Act. Id. at 14-15.
29 Id. at 14.
30 See Dodge, supra note 24, at 1267.
31 See Luckey, supra note 13, at 14-15.
32 Joseph Kartiganer et al., Report of Committee on Tax Legislation and Regulations: Generation-Skipping Transfers, 15 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 703, 703-06 (1980).
33 Id.
34 Luckey, supra note 13, at 15-16. This Act also provided for substantial changes to
the marital deduction, allowing unlimited tax-free transfers between spouses after Dec.
31, 1981. Id. at 16.

312

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:307

were pressuring for total repeal of the GST.35 Reportedly, since the
GST’s introduction in 1976, “the Treasury [had] barely been able to
carry out the provisions of the law because of the controversy over it.”36
The debate over the complexity of the GST rules continued to evolve,
and by mid-1984 the Senate had voted to repeal the GST altogether—
the House of Representatives, however, viewed the GST as a victory in
the “hard and long struggle to improve the fundamental equity of the
Federal transfer tax system” and refused its outright repeal.37 The perspective of practitioners in trust and estate law began to shift as well,
and both the Treasury and the American Law Institute put forward draft
legislation to revise—and retain—the GST.38 Both bills included provisions to cover “direct skips” where a donor transfers wealth directly to a
grandchild.39 Unlike the process leading up to the 1976 Act,40 the leadup to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 generated significant input on the
GST from the estate planning bar, the Treasury, and other sources.41
By 1986, Congress had resolved to reshape the GST to simplify administration and make sure the GST, gift tax, and estate tax all raised
revenue “in a manner that has as nearly as possible a uniform effect.”42
To accomplish this, Congress expanded the GST in the 1986 Act to include direct generation-skipping transfers (such as those directly from a
grandparent to a grandchild).43 To create this additional taxable event,
Congress defined a direct skip as “a transfer subject to estate or gift
taxes of an interest in property to a skip person,” and defined a skip
person as “a person assigned to a generation which is two or more gen35 Robert Whitman, Letter to the Editor, Loophold in the Making for the Most Affluent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1982, at A30 (arguing that the repeal was a “blatant attempt
to favor those who can best afford to pay their taxes.”).
36 Jonathan Fuerbringer, Senate Committee Backs Tax Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
14, 1984, at D22.
37 Malcolm A. Moore, Estate and Gift Tax Committee Report: Generation Skipping
Tax, 10 PROB. NOTES 106, 106 (1984) (quoting House Ways and Means Committee
Chairman Rostenkowski’s July 2, 1984 press release).
38 See Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax: Hearing on H.R. 6260 and H.R. 6261
Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 98th Cong. (1984).
39 Id. at 8.
40 See Dodge, supra note 24, at 1269 n. 21 (describing the “hasty fashion” in which
the GST was “rushed through Congress”).
41 See, e.g., Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax: Hearing on H.R. 6260 and H.R. 6261,
supra note 38 (compiling over 400 pages of testimony from the Treasury, ALI, American
Bankers Association, American Bar Association, American College of Probate Counsel
(now ACTEC), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, various state bar
associations, and proponents of GST alternatives).
42 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 1263 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986].
43 Id. at 1263.
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erations below the generation assignment of the transferor,” which included trusts if all the interests in the trust are held (or will be held, such
as upon termination) by a skip person.44 The 1986 Act also brought
within the scope of the GST generation-skipping transfers resulting
from a disclaimer, generation-skipping trust income distributions, and
generation-skipping transfers to more than one younger generation (as
where income is paid to grantor’s child for life, then to grantor’s
grandchild for life, with the remainder passing to grantor’s greatgrandchild).45 Additionally, the 1986 Act expanded the GST’s generation assignment rules to include more remote relations such as a grantor’s spouse’s aunts, uncles, and cousins.46 Finally, the 1986 Act
replaced the graduated GST based on the estate tax rates with a flat rate
set at the maximum estate and gift tax rate47 and provided for an exemption to allow (at that time) $1,000,000 to pass from a transferor to
skip persons GST-free.48 While intended to simplify and add uniformity
to the GST, the additional provisions were viewed by estate planners
both as new challenges as well as new opportunities.49
By 2001, the tides had shifted once again, and calls for repeal of the
estate tax and GST were answered in the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (the “EGTRRA”), which began the
phase-out of both taxes over the period from 2002 to 2009.50 Some commentators at the time viewed the changes ushered in by the EGTRRA
as “useful,” such as the expansion of the GST exemption’s automatic
allocation, but already questioned what lasting impact would occur as a
result of the GST’s expected repeal for the year 2010 and subsequent
44 Michael D. Mulligan & Scot. W. Boulton, New Generation-Skipping Tax: Higher
Rates, Broadened Scope, New Exemptions, 14 EST. PLAN. 10, 10 (1987).
45 See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, supra note 42,
at 1264.
46 Id. at 1260. Under the prior law, “generations were determined along family lines
where possible” and are otherwise determined (i.e., in cases of persons not related by
marriage, lineal descent, or adoption) using this formula: “Individuals not more than 12 1/2
years younger than the grantor were treated as members of the grantor’s generation;
individuals not more than 12 1/2 years younger than the grantor, but not more than 37 1/2
years younger, were considered members of his or her children’s generation, and so
forth.” Id. at 1261. “Similar rules are applied every 25 years,” and an individual is considered to be “a member of the youngest such generation” if they could be assigned to
more than one. See Mulligan & Boulton, supra note 44, at 18. Where Congress originally
came up with 25 years to define a generation remains elusive.
47 Luckey, supra note 13, at 19.
48 See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, supra note 42,
at 1264.
49 See Mulligan & Boulton, supra note 44, at 18.
50 See Luckey, supra note 13, at 26.
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restoration to 2001 levels in the year 2011.51 At “virtually the last minute,” Congress passed the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (the “TRA”),52 which
solved some of the thornier problems posed by the 2010 situation by
reinstating the GST for transactions in 2010,53 increasing the GST exemption to $5,000,000 as of January 1, 2010, and making the GST applicable rate for 2010 effectively zero.54 The American Taxpayer Relief
Act of 2012 (the “ATRA”) subsequently made permanent the changes
to the GST wrought by the EGTRRA and the 2010 Act, tying the GST
tax rate and exemption amount to the estate tax maximum rate and exemption amount,55 providing considerable stability for estate planners
in the wake of several years of substantial uncertainty. Dramatic
changes to the GST tax – aside from the residual chatter of the complete
repeal of all transfer taxes – does not appear to be a current legislative
priority. The GST tax is likely to stay just as it is, absent dramatic provocation for change.
III. SOCIOLOGICAL CHANGES

IN

GENERATIONAL STRUCTURE

The structure of the GST tax, however, does not exist in a vacuum.
Instead, it exists within the context of American society, where demographic shifts in how late in life individuals marry, give birth, and die
substantially affects what a legitimate definition of a “generation” is.
A. Increasing Childbearing Age
The age at which parents have children has changed over time. The
trend toward delayed parenthood began in the 1970s and became common in many countries by the end of the 1990s.56 The average age at
which women in the most developed countries bear children is over
30.57 Delayed parenthood has become an increasing phenomenon due
51 Carol A. Harrington et al., Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Planning After the
2001 Act: Mostly Good News, 95 J. TAX’N 143, 143-144 (Sept. 2001).
52 Jonathan G. Blattmachr et al., Estate Planning After the 2010 Tax Relief Act: Big
Changes, But Still No Certainty, 114 J. TAX’N 68, 68 (Feb. 2011).
53 Id. at 72-73.
54 DAVID WESTFALL & GEORGE P. MAIR, ESTATE PLANNING LAW & TAXATION ¶
20.01 (4th ed. 2001).
55 Id.
56 Tomás̆ Sobotka, Shifting Parenthood to Advanced Reproductive Ages: Trends,
Causes and Consequences, in A YOUNG GENERATION UNDER PRESSURE? 129-30 (J. C.
Tremmel ed. 2010).
57 Id. at 130-31. The average age of women at the birth of their first child is lower
than the overall average, however, due to high rates of teenage pregnancy and high rates
of pregnancy among lower-educated women and minority women (citing McLanahan
2004; Mathews & Hamilton 2002).

F15/W16]

THE GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX

315

to “social, economic, cultural, and lifestyle” changes among couples
since the 1970s.58 The three main reasons that couples choose to delay
parenthood are educational opportunities, career goals, and financial
stability.59
Delayed parenthood was first facilitated by the increased spread
and use of contraceptives, which began in the 1960s.60 Effective contraceptive methods, such as birth control pills and intrauterine devices,
have allowed couples to postpone having children.61 The legalization of
abortion has also enabled women to avoid unwanted births.62
In addition to advances in contraception, delayed parenthood can
be attributed to couples’ personal and economic goals.63 Many women
choose to delay starting a family in exchange for greater educational
opportunities.64 Such opportunities for women have increased since the
mid-twentieth century, and can be considered “the most important factor” contributing to delayed parenthood and accounts for about half of
the noted increase in the age of women at their first birth.65 One study
indicated that “each additional year of schooling results in a delay of
about three quarters of a year in age at first birth.”66 Because the demands of school arguably do not complement the tasks of motherhood,
many women choose to finish school before starting a family.67 Since
the 1970s, the percentage of women completing at least four full years of
college has about tripled.68
With higher education comes additional opportunities for employment, which also serve to delay parenthood.69 Women in the workplace
are more common in recent decades than in earlier eras, encouraging
women to focus on employment in addition to starting a family.70 The
majority of adult women waiting until they are older to have children
58

Id. at 131.
M. E. Betsy Garrison et al., Delayed Parenthood: An Exploratory Study of Family
Functioning, 46 FAM. REL. 281, 281 (1997) (citations omitted).
60 Sobotka, supra note 56, at 129, 132; Jane Riblett Wilkie, The Trend Toward
Delayed Parenthood, 43 J. MARRIAGE & FAM., 583, 584 (1981) (citing Taffel, 1977).
61 Wilkie, supra note 60, at 584.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Sobotka, supra note 56, at 131 (citing Beets et al. 2001).
66 Wilkie, supra note 60, at 584 (citing Rindfuss et al.1980).
67 Sobotka, supra note 56, at 131 (citing Blossfeld & Huinink 1991).
68 T. J. Mathews & Brady E. Hamilton, Mean Age of Mother, 1970-2000, DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,51 NAT’L VITAL STATS. REPS. 1 at 4 (Dec. 11, 2002), http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr51/nvsr51_01.pdf.
69 Wilkie, supra note 60, at 584.
70 Id. at 583.
59
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currently work full time.71 Working outside the home for a long period
of time has become “an expected and essential part” of many women’s
lives.72 The increase in opportunities for women outside the home has
resulted in diminished fertility and smaller families among working women compared to women remaining within the home.73 Since the 1970s,
the number of women working outside the home has increased by about
39%.74
Couples who desire higher education and increased employment
opportunities also seek financial stability, and will often wait to have
children until they feel they can afford to support a family.75 Having a
child early on in a woman’s career can result in an opportunity cost, as a
mother will have to balance both work and child, resulting in potential
lost income and promotions at work—the so-called “motherhood penalty.”76 A woman who waits to have children until she finds herself
well-settled in her career has the advantage of reducing any potential
motherhood penalty she may encounter.77 Women who postpone
parenthood in order to work “may be anticipating and realizing greater
compatibility of work and later childrearing through first gaining higher
levels of education, more highly skilled careers, and more seniority in
the workplace.”78 Less affluent couples also may choose to postpone
childbirth due to an unstable economy and risks of unemployment.79
Statistics from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reflect this trend. While the average age of women at the time of their
first childbirth was 21.4 in 1970, the average age rose to 24.9 by the year
2000.80 By the year 2012, the average age of a woman at the time of her
first birth rose to 25.8 years of age.81
The rate of fertility (defined as the number of live births that occur
to a woman) in the United States has remained stable in the last decade
71 Joyce C. Abma & Gladys M. Martinez, Childlessness Among Older Women in the
United States: Trends and Profiles, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1045, 1050-52 (2006).
72 Sobotka, supra note 56, at 132 (citing Goldin 2006).
73 Wilkie, supra note 60, at 584 (citing J. C. Cramer 1980; Waite & Stolzenberg
1976).
74 Mathews & Hamilton, supra note 68, at 4.
75 Wilkie, supra note 60, at 586-87.
76 Sobotka, supra note 56, at 132 (citing Joshi 2002; Miller 2008).
77 Id.
78 Abma & Martinez, supra note 71, at 1054 (citing Martin 2000).
79 Sobotka, supra note 56, at 131 (citing Mills & Blossfeld 2005; Adsera 2005).
80 Mathews & Hamilton, supra note 68, at 2.
81 Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2012, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., 62 NAT’L VITAL STATS. REPS. 9 at 2 (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_09.pdf.
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at about 2.1 children per woman who has given birth.82 Mothers in the
United States between the ages of 40 and 44 have on average about 2.1
children, thus supporting the idea that most women in the United States
have two or three children, and indicating that the average woman’s last
birth will be her second or third child.83 On average, men are slightly
older than women when they reach parenthood. While 85% of women
have had at least one birth by the time they turn 40 years old, only 76%
of men have had at least one child by the time they turn 40 years old.84
As of the year 2000, the average age of a woman giving birth to her
second child was about 27; the average age of a woman giving birth to
her third child in the year 2000 was about 29.85 In the year 2011, the
largest group of non-Hispanic women giving birth to their second child
was aged between 24 and 29 years, with the largest group of non-Hispanic women giving birth to their third child being aged between 30 and
34 years.86 In the year 2012, however, the largest group of non-Hispanic
women giving birth to their second or third child was aged between 30
and 34 years.87 This data indicates that women having their last child
are, on average, aged between 24 and 34 years. One source, however,
indicates that the average age at which a woman has her last child is 41
years.88 In any case, it appears that the age at which mothers are having
children – and therefore generational length – is increasing.
Not only is popular media recognizing a movement toward older
parenting,89 but data collected by the National Vital Statistics System
82 Gladys Martinez et al., Fertility of Men and Women Aged 15-44 Years in the
United States: National Survey of Family Growth, 2006-2010, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., 51 NAT’L HEALTH STATS. REPS. 1 at 1(Apr. 12, 2012), www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
nhsr/nhsr051.pdf.
83 See id. at 5.
84 See id. at 7.
85 See Mathews & Hamilton, supra note 68, at 2.
86 See Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2011, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., 62 NAT’L VITAL STATS. REPS. 1 at 27 tbl. 6 (June 28, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_01.pdf.
87 See id. at 9.
88 See Extending the Biological Clock: Becoming a Mother Later in Life, SEATTLE
REPROD. MED. (2015), http://seattlefertility.com/the-impact-of-age-on-female-fertility
(last visited May 11, 2016); Christie Aschwanden, Fertility 101, WEBMD (Jan. 31, 2009),
http://www.webmd.com/baby/features/fertility-101 (last visited May 11, 2016).
89 Judith Shulevitz, How Older Parenthood Will Upend American Society: The Scary
Consequences of the Grayest Generation, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 6, 2012), https://
newrepublic.com/article/110861/how-older-parenthood-will-upend-american-society (observes the delay in parenthood in the United States and discusses the negative effects of
the trend) (last visited May 11, 2016); Peg Tyre, A New Generation Gap: Late life Parents
Face Unique Challenges as well as Unexpected Pleasures, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 2004, at 68.
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has also recognized this trend.90 The birth rate since 1970 has experienced a decrease in women under 30 and an increase in women over
30.91 This change has been attributed to a trend in older parenting.92
The CDC also specifically noted that “[c]ollege [e]ducated women were
also more likely to have a first birth at age 30 or over (36%) than women with lower levels of education (3.5%– 10.7%).”93 This is noteworthy in that this relationship between education, income, and the age of
parents may also correlate to those individuals that are likely to incur
GST tax liability.
B. Trends in Generational Length and Life Expectancy
The United States Life Tables for 2009, part of the national Vital
Statistics Reports and published by the CDC, show that the average
child born in 2009 had a life expectancy of 78.5 years.94 The CDC
records show that as a person ages, his or her life expectancy becomes
longer.95 For example, people aged 35 years in 2009 could expect, on
average, to live for another 45.1 years.96 People aged 40 years in 2009
could expect, on average, to live for another 40.4 years.97 Thus, while
newborns have a life expectancy of 78.5 years, 35 year olds have a life
expectancy of 80.1 years, and 40 year olds have a life expectancy of 80.4
years.98 Furthermore, life expectancy for newborns has increased
slightly with the passage of time; in 2011, the life expectancy for
newborns was estimated to be 78.7 years, as compared to 78.5 in 2009,
74.8 in 1986 (the time of the second version of the GST), and 72.8 in
1976 (when the GST was introduced).99
90 “Given trends over the last decades toward later childbearing, particularly among
women with higher education, parity of older first-time mothers would ideally be examined within education and income groups.” Martinez et al., supra note 82, at 6.
91 Martin et al., supra note 86, at 22 tbl. 4; Brady E. Hamilton et al., Births: Preliminary Data for 2012, DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 62 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 3 at 3-5,
13 tbl. 5 (Sep. 6, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_03.pdf.
92 “Delayed childbearing in the United States is evident in the 3.6-year increase in
the average age at the first birth between 1970 and 2006.” T.J. Mathews & Brady E.
Hamilton, Delayed Childbearing: More Women Are Having Their First Child Later in
Life, DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 21, at 6, (Aug. 2009),
citations omitted), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db21.pdf.
93 Martinez et al., supra note 82, at 6.
94 Elizabeth Arias, United States Life Tables, 2009, DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
62 NAT’L VITAL STATS. REPS. 7 at 3 tbl. A (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_07.pdf.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Arialdi M. Miniño, Death in the United States, 2011, DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 115, at 1, (Mar. 2013); Manning Feinlieb et al., Vital
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Over the twentieth century, life expectancy has increased and mortality rates have lowered due to “the intricate interplay of advances in
income, salubrity, nutrition, education, sanitation, and medicine.”100
Specifically, developments such as “[a]ccess to primary medical care for
the general population, improved healthcare provided to mothers and
babies, availability of immunizations, improvements in motor vehicle
safety, clean water supply and waste removal, safer and more nutritious
foods, [and] the rapid rate of growth in the general standard of living”
have expanded life expectancy in the twentieth century.101 In the first
half of the twentieth century, life expectancy increased in large part due
to reduced childhood deaths.102 In the latter half of the twentieth century, life expectancy increased as a result of “improvements in survival
after age 65.”103 In the United States, the average life expectancy for a
woman in 1900 was about 51.1, compared with about 71.7 in 1950 and
about 79.0 in 1990.104 The average life expectancy for a man in the
United States was about 48.3 in 1900, about 66.0 in 1950, and about 72.1
in 1990.105 These numbers show that women typically live longer than
men. This trend has occurred at similar rates internationally among developed countries.106
Longer life expectancies and lowered mortality rates can also be
attributed to publicizing and increasing educational efforts about activities or situations that may pose health risks.107 For example, far fewer
people smoke cigarettes today than people did in the first half of the
twentieth century as a result of education and advertising, laws requiring
certain labels on tobacco products, and restricting smoking to certain
areas in public.108 Additionally, the creation of federal programs, such
Statistics of the United States, 1986, DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Oct. 1988), http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/lifetables/life86_2acc.pdf; Dorothy Price et al., Vital Statistics of
the United States, 1976, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE (1978), http://www.cdc
.gov/nchs/data/lifetables/life76.pdf.
100 Jim Oeppen & James W. Vaupel, Broken Limits to Life Expectancy, 296 SCI.1029,
1029 (May 10, 2002).
101 Felicitie C. Bell & Michael L. Miller, Life Tables for the United States Social Security Area 1900-2100, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., at 10-11, https://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/pdf_
studies/study120.pdf. (Aug. 2005).
102 See Oeppen & Vaupel, supra note 100, at 1029.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. Andrew Noymer & Michel Garenne, The 1918 Influenza Epidemic’s Effects
on Sex Differentials in Mortality in the United States, 26 POPUL. DEV REV. 565, 569
(2000), http://demog.berkeley.edu/~andrew/1918/PDR_1918_flu.pdf.
106 See Oeppen & Vaupel, supra note 100, at 1029.
107 Ellen R. Meara et al., The Gap Gets Bigger: Changes in Mortality and Life Expectancy, by Education, 1981-2000, 27 HEALTH AFF. 350, 356-57 (Mar. 2008), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/27/2/350.long.
108 Id. at 357-58.

320

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:307

as Medicaid, has assisted lower socioeconomic groups with access to
healthcare.109
While changes in life expectancy and mortality rates have occurred
over the twentieth century, such changes have not affected all people
equally. Highly educated groups in the United States have experienced
the largest advances in life expectancy and lowered mortality rates.110
This can be attributed in part to increased awareness within this group
of health dangers, such as smoking and obesity.111 One study found that
people with higher educational levels were less likely than less-educated
people to smoke or become obese, thus resulting in a longer life expectancy among highly-educated people.112
While some scientists hypothesize that society is reaching the limits
of aging, others point out that over the last century, humans have aged
beyond what scientists previously thought possible and continue to do
so, albeit in small increments.113 Future expansion in life expectancy
and lowered mortality rates will be affected by the following:
[d]evelopment and application of new diagnostic, surgical and
life sustaining techniques; [p]resence of environmental pollutants; [i]mprovements in exercise and nutrition; [i]ncidence of
violence; [i]solation and treatment of causes of disease;
[e]mergence of new forms of disease; [p]revalence of cigarette
smoking; [m]isuse of drugs (including alcohol); [e]xtent to
which people assume responsibility for their own health;
[e]ducation regarding health; [c]hanges in our conception of
the value of life; and [a]bility and willingness of our society to
pay for the development of new treatments and technologies,
and to provide these to the population as a whole.114
Because the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax presumes a generation 25 years apart, calculations looking at the actual survival time between such individuals is illuminating. The following comparisons look
at life expectancy gaps between those 80 and 55, 70 and 45, and 60 and
35.
Statistics for those aged 80 and 55: According to the current IRS
mortality tables, 49,181 per 100,000 persons are likely to die at age 80,
thus making the mortality rate for 80-year-olds about 49.2%.115 The
109

Id. at 358.
Id. at 356.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 See Oeppen & Vaupel, supra note 100, at 1031.
114 Bell & Miller, supra note 101, at 7.
115 Actuarial Tables, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., at tbl. 2000CM (Apr. 24, 2014),
http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Actuarial-Tables [hereinafter Actuarial Tables].
110
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same data indicate that 8,789 per 100,000 persons are likely to die at age
55, thus indicating a mortality rate for 55-year-olds of about 8.8%.116 In
2009, an average person 80 years of age had a life expectancy of 89.1
years, with 9.1 years left to live.117 An average person 55 years of age
had a life expectancy of 82.1 years, with 27.1 years left to live.118 Therefore, an average 80-year-old and an average 55-year-old in 2009 had a
gap of 18 years between their anticipated deaths.119
Statistics for those aged 70 and 45: The IRS mortality tables indicate that 25,206 per 100,000 persons aged 70 will die at that age, thus
rendering a mortality rate of about 25.5%.120 About 4,732 per 100,000
persons aged 45 will die at that age, indicating a mortality rate for 45
year olds of about 4.7%.121 In 2009, an average person 70 years of age
had a life expectancy of 85.5 years, with 15.5 years left to live.122 An
average person 45 years of age had a life expectancy of 80.8 years, with
35.8 years left to live.123 Therefore, an average 70 year old and an average 45 year old in 2009 had a gap of 20.3 years between their anticipated
deaths.124
Statistics for those aged 60 and 35: The IRS mortality tables show
that 12,405 per 100,000 60-year-olds will die at age 60, resulting in a
mortality rate of 12.4%.125 About 2,801 per 100,000 35-year-olds will
die at age 35, resulting in a mortality rate of 2.8%.126 In 2009, an average person 60 years of age had a life expectancy of 83.0 years, with 23.0
years left to live.127 An average person 35 years of age had a life expectancy of 80.1 years, with 45.1 years left to live.128 Therefore, an average
60-year-old and an average 35-year-old in 2009 had a gap of 22.1 years
expected left to live.129
This information shows that the mortality gap among older individuals is shorter, while the gap between younger individuals is longer.130
It also illustrates that the tax code rule defining a generation as two
individuals born 25 years apart may frequently result in taxing estates
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id.
Arias, supra note 94, at 3, tbl. A.
Id.
Id.
Actuarial Tables, supra note 115, at tbl. 2000CM.
Id.
Arias, supra note 94, at 3, tbl. A.
Id.
Id.
Actuarial Tables, supra note 115, at tbl. 2000CM.
Id.
Arias, supra note 94, at 3, tbl. A.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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more often than every 25 years – certainly more often than every “generation” where true gaps between parent and child may be 35-40 years.
Overall, the combined effect of increasing childbearing age and
later mortality is too important to ignore. The current rule deeming a
generation to last 25 years for GST tax purposes is not supportable by
modern demographic evidence and ought to be more closely tethered to
reality. Fortunately, the Tax Code has responded to changes in numbers
over time before and already includes a model that presents an elegant
solution to finding a number that is a moving target.
IV. INFLATION INDICES
The concepts of taxation and inflation aren’t new,131 but their prevalence in U.S. tax policy is relatively recent.132 Federal law has indexed
for inflation certain Social Security benefits and military pensions since
1969.133 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 introduced inflation indexing of dollar amount limitations tied to qualified
retirement plans, and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 expanded the use of inflation indexing to broader aspects of the tax
code.134 Since then, additional provisions for inflation indexing have
been made throughout the tax code,135 though many areas remain
unindexed and are the subject of no small debate on the matter.136 Key
historical factors, particularly in the 1970s, drove the original notion of
indexing the tax code for inflation.
The U.S. experienced unprecedented economic growth and egalitarian prosperity from roughly 1950 to 1970,137 and during that period the
economy grew at about 4% per year and inflation remained around
131

Michael F. Bryan, On the Origin and Evolution of the Word Inflation, FED. REBANK OF CLEVELAND, ECON. COMMENTARY (Oct. 15, 1997) (describing the coevolution of concepts of inflation with economics and American historical developments). A digital version of this piece is available for download at https://www.cleveland
fed.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-commentary/economic-commentary-archives/1997-economic-commentaries/ec-19971015-on-the-origin-and-evolution-of-the-word-inflation.aspx (last visited May 11, 2016).
132 See Richard J. Kovach, Technical and Policy Standards for Inflation Adjustments
Under the Internal Revenue Code, 33 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 603, 605 (2008).
133 The 1982-83 Fed. Tax Comm. of the Am. Accounting Ass’n., Indexing the Tax
Law to Adjust for Inflation, 62 TAXES 125, 126 (Feb. 1984) [hereinafter Tax Comm.].
134 Kovach, supra note 132, at 605.
135 Id.
136 See, e.g., id. at 611-19.
137 Sameer Dossani, Chomsky: Understanding the Crisis—Markets, the State and Hypocrisy, FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS (Feb. 9, 2009), http://fpif.org/chomsky_understanding_
the_crisis_markets_the_state_and_hypocrisy/ (last visited May 11, 2016).
SERVE
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2%,138 excepting some occasional spikes.139 By the late 1960s, however,
U.S. spending on the Vietnam War and the Cold War along with the
government’s deteriorating foreign trading position strained the federal
government’s ability to meet its obligations under the Bretton Woods
agreement to keep the price of gold at $35 per ounce.140 In 1971, President Nixon ended the convertibility of U.S. dollars to gold, dismantling
the system of fixed exchange rates established at the end of World War
II.141 While Nixon hoped to prevent the overvaluing of the dollar and
promote U.S. exports,142 his move exposed the dollar to increasing speculative market pressure that drove the value of the dollar lower and
lower.143 By 1974, inflation skyrocketed to 11%144 and would continue
to peak into the double-digits until the early 1980s.145 Flipping the relationship between growth of the economy and growth of the money supply maintained during the early 1960s, the money supply grew around
7% per year from 1975-1979, while the economy grew 3.5%.146
By 1977, inflation had become “a fact of life,”147 and by 1978, a
Roper poll indicated that “60% of all American taxpayers favor[ed] indexation of the personal income tax.”148 The demand for indexing the
income tax grew from the dual tax phenomena observed when price
138 Gordon Williams, Inflation Gets Back to Normal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1985, http://
www.nytimes.com/1985/01/06/business/inflation-gets-back-to-normal.html?pagewanted=
all.
139 See William A. Kelley, Jr., Indexing for Inflation, 31 TAX LAW. 17, 17 (1977) (for
example, the inflation rate spiked to 6.8% in 1951 during the Korean War).
140 See Milestones: 1969-1976: Nixon and the End of the Bretton Woods System, 19711973, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (Oct. 31, 2013), https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/nixon-shock [hereinafter Nixon Shock].
141 Id.
142 The prevalent economic belief of the day held that moderate inflation would promote full employment, boosting the economy: Economists today view the simplistic Phillips Curve-based macroeconomics of Nixon’s day as short-sighted and instead prefer to
focus on price stability as a means to promote economic growth. See William Poole &
David C. Wheelock, Stable Prices, Stable Economy: Keeping Inflation in Check Must Be
No. 1 Goal of Monetary Policymakers, THE REG’L ECONOMIST (Jan. 2008), https://
www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/january-2008/stable-prices-stableeconomy-keeping-inflation-in-check-must-be-no-1-goal-of-monetary-policymakers (last
visited May 11, 2016).
143 See Nixon Shock, supra note 140. Prof. Chomsky describes the breakdown of the
Bretton Woods system as “probably the major international event since 1945,” propelling
the financialization of the economy and shaping where finance capital moved—away
from manufacturing and into speculation. Dossani, supra note 137.
144 Kelley, supra note 139, at 17.
145 See Tax Comm., supra note 133, at 125.
146 Williams, supra note 138.
147 Kelley, supra note 139, at 17.
148 Larry Kreiser & James W. Minnery, 1979—The Year for Indexing the Personal
Income Tax, 57 TAXES 301, 301 (May 1979).
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levels rise: first, “inflation causes taxable income to increase more rapidly than total income because of the decreasing value to the taxpayer of
flat allowances such as personal exemptions and the zero bracket
amount; and second, “[a]n increase in taxable income causes more income to be taxed in higher tax brackets at a higher marginal rate.”149
Taxpayers in the 1970s were hit with the double-whammy of declining
real incomes and increasing tax burdens.150 Taxpayers in the 1970s were
also subject to severe inflation distortions in capital asset transactions.151
By the end of the 1970s, the federal government increasingly relied
upon indexing for inflation to protect benefits, pensions, and wages
from erosion.152 The tax code would soon receive similar treatment.
Initially, the legislative solution to rising inflation was to enact
piecemeal tax reductions,153 at times overcompensating for the amount
of actual inflation affecting the economy.154 These piecemeal reductions also had the effect of unevenly distributing tax relief across tax
brackets relative to the proportional impact of inflation on tax liabilities—generally, Congress gave relief to lower-income taxpayers, higherincome taxpayers were less affected to begin with, and middle-income
taxpayers were left with the greatest burden.155 Eventually, Congress
came to recognize three principal effects of inflation on the rate structure of the income tax: (1) “that taxpayers may pay a larger share of
their incomes to the federal government unless tax rates are cut periodically through formal legislation,” (2) “that [inflation] changes the distribution of the tax burden among taxpayers in different income groups,”
and (3) “that [inflation] makes the tax code less able to distinguish, for
tax purposes, among persons with similar incomes but different economic or personal circumstances” such as when a taxpayer has more

149

Id. at 301-02.
“A family of four with an income of $10,000 in 1968 would need an income of
$18,470 in 1978 to keep pace with inflation. Because of this increase in nominal income,
however, the family’s marginal tax bracket would have increased from 19% to 25%.” Id.
at 302.
151 For example, unimproved real estate purchased in 1950 for $20,000 and sold in
1974 for $50,000 resulted in $30,000 taxable gain to the taxpayer, but if the basis in the
property were to have been adjusted for inflation, the actual gain in purchasing power to
the taxpayer resulting from the sale would have been only $6,600. Kelley, supra note 139,
at 18-19.
152 See Kreiser & Minnery, supra note 148, at 302-03.
153 Tax Comm., supra note 133, at 127 (noting Congress’ response to rapid inflation
through “so-called income tax cuts in 1969, 1971, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, and 1981”).
154 Kelley, supra note 139, at 19. In 1974 and 1975, Congress reduced taxes enough
to cover 12% inflation. Id.
155 See id.; see also Kreiser & Minnery, supra note 148, at 302.
150
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dependents.156 Congress finally incorporated provisions for indexing
the individual income tax in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981157
(the “ERTA”), albeit in a limited form.158 The ERTA scheduled the tax
code for partial indexation beginning in 1985.159 Some questions, like
what measure of inflation to use, still persist.160
Although Congressional studies had identified each of the dozens
of fixed dollar amounts in the tax code,161 the ERTA adjustments for
inflation only covered the “tax rate brackets, the zero bracket amount,
and personal and dependency exemptions.”162 Some of the same arguments in favor of indexing identified by Congress in 1980—holding
steady the shares of personal incomes collected in income taxes and the
distribution of that tax burden, along with government accountability—
persisted after passage of the ERTA, particularly among academics and
practitioners who called for the further or complete indexation of the
tax code.163
In 1984, the Treasury Department proposed (among numerous
other reforms) to comprehensively index the tax code for inflation, urging Congress to go beyond the indexation provided for by the ERTA for
both individuals and businesses through rate structure and tax base adjustments.164 While Congress’s response, the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
did extend indexing to the earned income tax credit and to the thenreintroduced standard deduction, Congress did not pursue total indexation.165 Scholars and commentators since then have continued to call
156 Hyman Sanders & Joshua Greene, Indexing the Individual Income Tax for Inflation, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, at 5-7, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
96th-congress-1979-1980/reports/80doc26.pdf (1980), [hereinafter CBO STUDY].
157 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
158 See generally Aharon Yoran & Charles P. Shimer, Adjusting Taxes for Inflation:
The Impact of the Economic Recovery Tax Act, 23 B.C. L. REV. 1257 (1982) (examining
how the ERTA as enacted in1981 failed to fully offset the effects of inflation on the
individual taxpayer and proposing amendments to improve the ERTA’s effectiveness).
159 Id. at 1257.
160 For example, using a lower inflation index could reduce Social Security expenditures by billions annually (or increase income tax receipts). See Josh Zumbrun, Who
Really Benefits from Social Security’s Cost-of-Living Index? Depends How Long You
Live, WALL ST. J. ECON. BLOG (Sept. 11, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://on.wsj.com/1lYdqeh.
161 CBO STUDY, supra note 156, at Appendix A.
162 Tax Comm., supra note 133, at 134.
163 Compare CBO STUDY, supra note 156, at 25-27, with Tax Comm., supra note 133,
at 127-128. These sources also indicate that some of the same arguments against indexing, related to legislative flexibility and economic impact, persisted after enactment
among proponents of indexation’s repeal.
164 See John T. Plecnik, Abolish the Inflation Tax on the Poor & Middle Class, 29
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 925, 956-58 (2011).
165 Id. at 957.
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for broadened application of indexing the tax code, particularly with regard to tax base elements.166
Since 1986, dozens of Internal Revenue Code provisions have been
indexed for inflation.167 In the 1990s, Congress brought the estate and
gift taxation regimes within the indexation framework,168 applying an
inflation adjustment to the annual exclusion amount from taxable
gifts169 and increasing the unified credit over a period of years that approximated its adjustment for inflation from 1988 levels.170 The increases to the lifetime estate tax exemption were accelerated under the
EGTRRA and subsequent legislation, “over[shooting] the inflation-adjusted levels by increasingly large margins.”171 At the end of 2010, Congress passed the TRA, which temporarily extended the provisions of the
EGTRRA, including the $5 million estate, gift, and Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax exemption amount, indexed for inflation from 2010
beginning in 2012.172 The TRA extension of the indexed exemption
amount was made permanent by the ATRA.173 One key provision of
estate taxation which remains unindexed is the marital deduction for
bequests to a surviving spouse:174 “assets inherited from the deceased
spouse by the surviving spouse may continue to increase in value without shelter of the appreciation from estate taxation at the death of the
surviving spouse,”175 although some protection against increased taxation may be afforded by appropriate planning176 or by relying on the
surviving spouse’s estate tax exemption, provided it remains adjusted
for inflation, to keep pace with the appreciation of the deceased
spouse’s bequeathed assets.
166 See, e.g., Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Tax Code, 48 TAX L. REV. 537 (1993)
(examining indexation of debt and capital assets).
167 Kovach, supra note 132, at 605.
168 Peter T. Kirkwood, Estate, Gift, and Trust Tax Changes Made by Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997, 71 FLA. B.J. 49, 49-50 (Dec. 1997).
169 Id. See I.R.C. § 2503(b)(2).
170 See Nonna A. Noto, Indexing the Estate Tax Exemption for Inflation, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS Rep. No. 33501, at 6 (2006), http://crs.wikileaks-press.org/
RL33501.pdf.
171 See id. at 5-6.
172 Steve R. Akers, Estate Planning Effects and Strategies Under the ‘Tax Relief . . .
Act of 2010’, at 6, https://www.naepc.org/journal/issue07p.pdf (2011). See I.R.C.
§§ 2010(c)(3)(B), 2505(a), & 2631(c).
173 Robert E. Ward, Planning Opportunities in the American Taxpayer Relief Act of
2012, 27 PRAC. TAX LAW. 47, 48 (2013).
174 I.R.C. § 2056.
175 Ward, supra note 173, at 53-54.
176 Id. at 54 (describing how a bypass trust or other device to leverage unused GST
exemption can help).
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In addition to estate and gift tax provisions, the ATRA included an
extension of increases to the exemption to the alternative minimum tax
(the “AMT”), and indexed the exemption for inflation.177 The AMT
had notoriously subjected “an ever greater number of middle-class taxpayers” to higher effective tax rates as incomes rose past fixed statutory
thresholds that weren’t adjusted for inflation.178 The ATRA also restored limitations on the personal exemption and itemized deductions
for higher-income taxpayers, indexing the income thresholds over which
taxpayers trigger a graduated reduction in those deductions.179 This
treatment is in line with that of other eligibility limitations that are indexed for inflation, such as the retirement savings deduction180 and the
Roth IRA,181 which in turn helps keep such provisions “consistently
available to . . . taxpayers who earn an amount of real income that is
within the statutory limitation.”182
Inflation has remained low for many years now, and the economy
has exhibited significant price stability despite shocks as extreme as terrorist attacks and the subprime lending crisis.183 Economists expect inflation to remain low for the rest of the decade.184 Due to the political
unpalatability of tax increases, the federal government may slow its embrace of indexation or change its measure of inflation in order to quietly
phase out credits and raise revenues in the face of its on-going spending
obligations.
V. PROPOSING

AN

INFLATION-INDEX

FOR

GENERATIONS

Just as the value of money does not remain constant over time,
neither does the length of a generation. Changes in society relating to
not only increasing choices to delay parenthood but medical technology
enabling parents to make that choice means that the gap between generations is lengthening. Out of fairness, unrelated parties ought to be as177

Id. at 56.
Jim Chen, The Price of Macroeconomic Imprecision: How Should the Law Measure Inflation?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1375, 1387-88 (2003).
179 Ward, supra note 173, at 51.
180 See I.R.C. § 219(g)(8).
181 See I.R.C. § 408A(c)(3)(D).
182 Kovach, supra note 132, at 605-06.
183 Poole & Wheelock, supra note 142.
184 Narayana Kocherlakota, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Remarks
at Town Hall Forum, Carroll College (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/
news-and-events/presidents-speeches/opening-remarks-20140904 (last visited May 11,
2016) (warning that sustained low inflation risks underutilizing American workers).
178
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signed to generations that approximate those of familial relationships.185
A static rule dictating that a donor 37.5 years older than his intended
beneficiary should be treated as a grandparent for GST tax purposes is
no longer realistic and was perhaps never fair.
A better approach than the current rule is to use data to inform
numbers used in the Code. Just as the Treasury looks to outside data to
calculate the rate of inflation and adjust numbers annually, it ought to
look to changes in demographic data to adjust those numbers periodically. Unfortunately, since the reference to generational length is in the
Code itself, the Code must first itself be modified to allow for such adjustments. A potential amendment to the Code could allow section
2651(d)186 to provide as follows:
(d) Persons who are not lineal descendants — An individual
who is not assigned to a generation by any of the foregoing
provisions of this section shall be assigned to a generation on
the basis of the date of such individual’s birth with –
(1) an individual born not more than half a generation after the date of the transferor assigned to the transferor’s
generation;
(2) an individual born more than half a generation after
but not more than 1.5 generations after the date of the birth of
the transferor assigned to the first generation younger than the
transferor; and
(3) similar rules for a new generation; with
(4) the term “generation” defined in regulations to this
Code section to be promulgated by the Treasury, and to be periodically updated based upon sociographic data on generational length.
Adjustments could be based on data from multiple sources, but one
possibility is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Data
from that agency shows that the average age at first birth for a mother
has risen 4.4 years between 1970187 and 2012.188 Statistics on birth of
later children ought also to be considered as well as data on the age of
185 On the difficulty of defining “family” for tax purposes, see generally Tessa R.
Davis, Mapping the Families of the Internal Revenue Code, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 179
(2015).
186 The current I.R.C. provision assigns an individual born not more than 12.5 years
after the transferor to the same generation as the transferor, an individual born more
than 12.5 years but not more than 37.5 years after the transferor to the first generation
younger than the transferor, and uses a similar model for assessing more remote generations every 25 years. I.R.C. § 2651(d)(1)-(3).
187 Mathews & Hamilton, supra note 68, at 1.
188 Martin et al., supra note 86, at 9.
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fathers. At a minimum, it seems reasonable to conclude that the true
demographic length of a generation has expanded roughly half a decade
since the establishment of the generational length under the GST tax.
VI. CONCLUSION
The only constant in life is change.189 When Congress ignores dramatic demographic change and fails to update the Internal Revenue
Code to reflect it, we are imposing a static document onto a transitioning society. It is fully within the capability of Congress and Treasury to
adapt to numerical shifts, and indices to reflect evolving figures already
abound in the Code. It is time to recognize the potential for the use of
sociological data to make numerical references in the Code more fair,
accurate, and responsive to change. By enacting a generation-inflation
index, Congress can create a more modern and honest system for assessing taxes against unrelated donors. Perhaps in the next few decades,
estate planning will truly grow up.

189 Or as Plato puts it, “Heraclitus, I believe, says that all things pass and nothing
stays, and comparing existing things to the flow of a river, he says you could not step
twice into the same river.” Daniel W. Graham, Heraclitus, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heraclitus/ (last visited May 11, 2016).

